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February 24, 2014 
 
The Honorable John A. Koskinen 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-134417-13), Room 5205 
Internal Revenue Service 
1111 Constitution Avenue NW 
Washington, DC 20224 
 
Re: Comments on Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate- 
Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) 
 
Submitted By:  
 
Brian Galle, Associate Professor, Boston College Law School; and  
Donald Tobin, John C. Elam/Vorys Sater Professor of Law, Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law. 
 
Dear Commissioner Koskinen: 
 
We respectfully submit these comments in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (the 
“Notice”) issued by the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS” or “Service”) and the Treasury 
Department on November 29, 2013. : 
Executive Summary 
The Notice is  a good first step.  It creates bright-line standards that are easy to apply and 
that will eliminate much of the gray area regarding permissible political activity.  Clearer lines 
will reduce the discretion on the part of the IRS.  By decreasing the IRS’s discretion, the 
regulation will reduce the opportunity for the IRS to be used as a political tool in an 
Administration’s tool box. 
However, the Notice does not go far enough.  Congress has established a regulatory 
regime that has as its central purpose the disclosure of any significant campaign contributions by 
individuals or firms.  In recent years many organizations have exploited the confidentiality rules 
of § 501(c)(4) to evade that regime, to the detriment not only of U.S. political discourse but also 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2399315 
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the non-profit sector.  The Final Rule should ensure that groups with significant partisan political 
activity cannot obtain exemption under § 501(c)(4), or indeed under any parallel provision of § 
501.     
We believe, however, that groups carrying out “substantial” electioneering activities 
should generally be eligible for exemption under § 527, and that the IRS should make that clear 
in the Final Rule.  The main consequence of any ruling denying § 501(c)(4) status based on the 
political activity of the organization, therefore, would simply be to require the disclosure of an 
organization’s donors, and to ensure that the organization’s political expenditures are disclosed 
contemporaneously with the election they seek to influence.   
Accordingly, the Final Rule should be designed in a way that channels organizations with 
any substantial amount of undisclosed electioneering activity into § 527.  For example, we 
propose a strong presumption that any group with candidate-related political activityof more than 
10% of its budget, or of more than an overall cap of some amount, such as $1 million, whichever 
is lesser, should be recognized as a § 527 political organization and not as a § 501c(4) social 
welfare organization.  The final rule should interpret “electioneering” broadly to include facially 
non-partisan activities that can be used to partisan advantage, including candidate-related 
advertising that falls outside the window immediately surrounding an election.  Groups that 
voluntarily disclose their donors could retain c(4) status.   
 Additionally, we suggest that the IRS seriously consider developing rules to limit the use 
of for-profit entities to evade § 527.  We urge the IRS to take a clearer stand on its enforcement 
plans and legally dubious Forms 990.  And we argue that nothing in the Notice, or in what we 
additionally suggest here, would raise serious First Amendment concerns.  
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Congressional Purpose to Bring Transparency to Campaign Funding Should 
Be the Cornerstone of the Regulations  
The Final Regulation should ensure that sections 501 and 527 work together seamlessly 
to ensure that political expenditures of any significant size are disclosed to the American public 
in a timely fashion.  Transparency was a key Congressional purpose when it amended § 527 in 
2000, and we believe it remains a critically important policy.  The Final Regulation can achieve 
that result by adhering closer to the statutory language in § 501(c)(4) and adopting a definition of 
the statutory term “exclusively” that is closer to the ordinary meaning of that word.  The current 
regulation allows an organization to claim social welfare status as long as social welfare is its 
primary activity, instead of requiring the organization to be exclusively involved in such activity.  
In doing so, the regulations allow organizations to circumvent congressional intent with regard to 
campaign disclosure contained in § 527.   By adopting a definition closer to the ordinary 
meaning of exclusively, instead of the more liberal definition,  campaign contributions will be 
funneled into § 527 political organizations and governed by the applicable disclosure rules.    
The legislative history of §527 demonstrates Congress’ desire to reveal the sources of 
political spending.  As was widely reported in the run-up to the amendments, voters and 
congresspersons alike were “outraged” by news that “shadowy political organizations” had spent 
millions influencing that term’s elections.1 Senator Lieberman, a sponsor of the legislation 
expressed his fear that: 
None of us should doubt that the proliferation of these groups– with their 
potential to serve as secret slush funds for candidates and parties, their ability to run 
difficult-to-trace attack ads, and their promise of anonymity to those seeking to spend 
huge amounts of money to influence our elections – poses a real and significant threat 
                                                 
1 Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that § 527(j) was 
enacted in part “in response to the spectacular increase in the use of § 527 organizations for tax-exempt political 
expenditures with limited public scrutiny”).  For cogent reviews of the history of the § 527 amendments, see Ellen P. 
Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION 
L.J. 363 (2011); Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem … and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 
949 (2005). 
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to the integrity and fairness of our elections. . . .2   
 
Congress had earlier attempted to shine a light on political spending in an amendment to 
FECA, which provide for disclosure of all direct contributions of $200 or more to candidates for 
federal public office.  Another key motivation for the §527 amendments was to prevent the use 
of nonprofits to evade FECA’s disclosure limits.3 
In response, Congress amended §527 to provide for disclosure of all but the smallest 
political contributions and expenditures.  Donee organizations must disclose all contributors of 
$200 or more, and all expenditures by the firm of $500 or more. 4    Not coincidentally, the $200 
individual contribution threshold mirrors FECA. 
Section 527 also ensures that disclosure of political activities will be available to the 
public in time for voters to make use of that information.  While § 501(c)(4) organizations must 
disclose “political campaign and lobbying activities” on their annual tax return, that document 
need not be filed until after the close of the organization’s fiscal year.  In contrast, § 527(j) 
requires disclosures no later than twelve days before and thirty days after each election.    
A relatively restrictive definition of “exclusively” thus effectuates congressional purpose 
to the extent that it prevents groups from using § 501(c)(4) to circumvent the §527 and FECA 
disclosure rules, as many have done.  Organizations wishing to organize as social welfare 
organizations instead of as political organizations embraced several techniques to putatively 
meet the social welfare purpose requirement.  While some groups mixed their electioneering 
with substantial amounts of recognized social welfare activities, such as lobbying, others sought 
                                                 
2 See 146 CONG. REC. S8333 (daily ed. May 17, 2000) (statement of Sen. Lieberman). 
3 See 146 CONG. REC. S4110 (daily ed. May 17, 2000) (statement of Rep. Haughton); Mobile Republican Assembly, 
353 F.3d at 1359-60  (describing § 527(j) as a response to judicial opening of loopholes in the original text of 
FECA); Aprill, 10 ELECTION L.J. at 385-86. 
4 I.R.C. § 527(j)(1), (j)(3)(A), (j)(3)(B) (requiring disclosure of donors who contribute more than $200, and 
expenditures by the organization over $500). 
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to meet § 501(c)(4)’s requirements by classifying campaign related activities as social welfare 
activities.  Contrary to rulings from the IRS, many of these groups appeared to take the position 
that as long as the activity was not election related under the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) rules, it was a social welfare activity.5  Some groups even took the position that 
communication that was reported to the FEC was not campaign intervention activity for purposes 
of determining social welfare status.6 
Since there is little net tax advantage to § 501(c)(4) status --- indeed, § 527 organizations 
appear to fall outside the coverage of major nonprofit regulatory regimes that might impose 
excise taxes, such as § 49587 --- it is evident that the purpose for the camouflage we have 
described is to evade § 527(j).8  The IRS should not allow groups to avoid disclosure by 
impersonating social welfare organizations when the organizations are really political 
organizations.  Nor should the IRS permit groups that are not wholly political, but wish to 
conceal political contributions or expenditures that would be disclosable under §527(j), from 
hiding under the cloak of § 501(c)(4). 
Separating Elections and Social Welfare Is Good Nonprofit Policy 
Election law aside, limiting electioneering by nonprofit organizations is necessary to 
preserve a well-functioning independent sector.  Because nonprofits offer only weak mechanisms 
for oversight of their managers, and because of the absence of any disciplining market for 
                                                 
5 E.g., Joe Hallett, It’ll be a long campaign for Ohio’s fact-checkers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 9, 2013 (noting 
that We the People Convention, Inc., claimed activities were education but that conventions were “showcases for 
conservative politics and candidates.”); Club for Growth, IRS Form 990 for Fiscal Year 2012, Sched. C p.3. 
6 Barber, How Nonprofits Spend Millions on Elections and Call it Public Welfare, ProPublica, Aug. 18, 2012, 
available at http://www.propublica.org/article/how-nonprofits-spend-millions-on-elections-and-call-it-public-
welfare. 
7 See I.R.C. § 4958(e) (stating that intermediate sanctions regime applies to 501(c)(3), (4), and (29) organizations). 
8 Contributions to section 501(c)(4) and 527 organizations may differ slightly in their effects on donors.  For 
example,  transfers to § 527 organizations may escape the federal gift tax, while donations to § 501(c)(4) arguably 
do not.  Aprill, 10 ELECTION L.J. at 384-85; see also Tobin, The Application of the Gift Tax Provisions in the 
Internal Revenue Code to § 501(c)(4) Organizations, ElectionLaw@Moritz, available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=8335. 
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corporate control, nonprofit stakeholders have only tenuous influence over the behavior of those 
who run the firm.  In such an environment, partisan political activity presents a danger of deeply 
disrupting the original charitable or social welfare aims of the organization.  Managers may trade 
off the firm’s resources for personal gain or ideological goals, or otherwise distort the mission of 
the organization to please possible political allies, and stakeholders will be largely powerless to 
intervene.    
Even if relatively few managers actually misuse their influence in these ways, the very 
possibility that they might do so can damage all nonprofits.9  Rational donors will not give 
money knowing that their contribution can easily be diverted to private goals without their 
knowledge.  Indeed, most commentators now believe that the very existence of the nonprofit 
form is a response to exactly this problem of managerial opportunism.10  More generally, public 
confidence in the mission and efficacy of the nonprofit sector could be undermined by 
perceptions that it is involved in partisan conflict.  Since these effects are all “externalities” --- 
that is, they harm outsiders as well as those within any individual nonprofit --- stakeholders of 
each individual nonprofit will rationally under-invest in efforts to prevent them.  Government 
intervention is necessary.    
These considerations also make a strong case for mandating transparency of nonprofit 
political involvement.  If nonprofits could credibly disclose the extent of outside political 
influence, donors and other supporters would no longer have reasons to doubt that firms are 
committed to their social welfare mission.  In the absence of regulatory mandates and oversight, 
however, no such disclosures are credible, since it is in the interest of all managers to claim there 
                                                 
9 The undersigned have addressed these issues in greater depth elsewhere.  Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A 
Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561, 1591-1614 (2013); Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by 
Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1319-42 (2007). 
10 Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 506-07 (1981). 
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is little outside influence and stakeholders have no reliable means of verifying the claim.  We 
emphasize the importance of disclosing outside support because stakeholders also cannot easily 
observe nonprofit outputs; it is hard to tell if the manager is trading off some aspect of the social 
welfare mission for political gain.  By requiring disclosure of both politically-motivated donors 
and firms’ political spending, the government could somewhat alleviate the other stakeholders’ 
dilemma. 
We acknowledge, however, that transparency to such a degree would potentially conflict 
with the apparent congressional policy of maintaining confidentiality for donors to most non-
political nonprofit organizations.  Accordingly, to the extent that greater transparency is not 
possible within the bounds of § 501(c)(4), we believe that the best remaining approach would be 
to separate most political spending from charitable and social welfare firms.  As we explain 
below, however, we do think some incrementally greater transparency is possible, even within 
the strictures of § 6103.   
The Final Regulation Should Revisit the “Primary Purpose” Standard  
Although the Notice does not address the primary purpose standard, it does invite 
comment regarding whether the standard should be revised, what amount of activity should 
constitute primary purpose and how that amount should be calculated.  If the final regulations are 
going to usefully curtail abusive activity, they must clarify the primary purpose standard.  Under 
the current vague standard, groups, and it appears the IRS, have no clear guidance regarding 
what constitutes the primary purpose of an organization.11  The vague standard, especially in 
light of the IRS’s lack of enforcement, allows groups to self-determine the amount of social 
welfare activity that is sufficient to justify exempt status.  If the IRS cannot articulate a standard 
                                                 
11 Commentators have suggested anywhere from 10% to 49.9% might be allowed under the standard. 
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for organizations to follow there is a significant risk that the IRS will once again find itself being 
accused of biased enforcement. 
Therefore the Final Regulation should clarify the amount of non-exempt activity that is 
allowed under the primary purpose standard.  In the church and charity context, the IRS has 
provided guidance regarding the primary purpose standard and through regulations has indicated 
that in order to satisfy the primary purpose standard an organization may engage in only an 
insubstantial amount of non-exempt activity.  An ABA task force recommended that forty 
percent of a group’s activity could be for a non-exempt purpose, and the IRS appears to have 
been, at some point, applying a fifty-percent standard.12  In related contexts, courts have 
generally rejected a firm percentage rule in favor of generalized balancing tests.13 
 In keeping with the principles we outlined above, we would propose a much more 
restrictive standard whose primary effect would be that most cash contributions be subject to the 
§ 527 disclosure regime, as Congress intended.  As we will explain, we believe that any 
organization that fails to qualify for § 501(c)(4) by reason of its political activity should, and 
under current law could, be eligible for exemption under §527.  Therefore, since disclosure is the 
main justification we see for separate classification of 527 and c(4) groups, § 501(c)(4) 
organizations that voluntarily disclose all donations should be exempt from additional scrutiny.14    
                                                 
12 See Comments of the Individual Members of the Exempt Organizations Committee’s Task Force on Section 
501(c)(4) and Politics 9, May 25, 2004.  In a presentation on this issue, the then Director of the IRS’s Exempt 
Organizations Division indicated “[w]hen it comes to political activities, that is, giving money to a candidate, telling 
people to vote for a certain candidate, the rule is that it has to be less than primary.  If it’s 49 percent of their income, 
that is less than primary.”  Marcus Owens, Practicing Law Institute Program on Corporate Political Activities, 3 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 471 (June 1990). 
13 Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855-56 (10th Cir. 1972); Manning Assoc. v. 
Comm’r, 93 T.C. 596, 610-11 (1989). 
14 Again, since c(4) organizations appear to be subject to more exacting oversight of potential “excess benefit” 
transactions than do § 527 groups, we believe it is preferable to encourage groups to obtain exemption under § 
501(c)(4). 
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 Further, we believe that clarity, predictability, and ease of administration are more 
important than achieving the most perfectly nuanced determinations.  Given the political 
pressures that inevitably are brought to bear in this area, and the scarcity of IRS resources for 
nonprofit enforcement generally, a process that is as nearly mechanical as possible would be 
preferable to one that calls for complex (and inevitably somewhat subjective) balancing.  Though 
(as we will explain) we do not see constitutional objections to the current or proposed regime, we 
also note that a more mechanical process is less subject to the criticism that it is 
unconstitutionally vague.   
Thus, the Final Rule should adopt a bright-line test that is mainly based on the 
expenditures of an organization and its non-527 related entities.  Though this is a very crude 
measure of an organization’s activity and purpose, it is fairly easy to measure and quantify.  
Some questions will remain about what items should be included in the “numerator” as partisan, 
but the minimal consequences of any adverse determination should make the importance of these 
questions minor as well.  We will return to these definitional issues, and additional steps the IRS 
can take to ease any possible burden of subjecting some organizations to regulation under § 527, 
shortly. 
For example, the Final Rule could adopt an approach modeled on the safe harbor set out 
by Congress in § 501(h).  Organizations could make expenditures up to a percentage of their 
revenues, such as 10%.  Sincewe see no reason why large organizations should be more secret or 
more influential than smaller ones, we would also suggest adopting an overall cap, as § 501(h) 
does.  We would set that cap at a level rather lower than § 501(h)’s $ 1million, however, in order 
to better implement Congress’ intent that all expenditures of over $500 be disclosed.     
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In the event the Treasury concludes that a § 501(h) model standing alone is insufficiently 
flexible, organizations that fail the expenditures test could also attempt to satisfy a “facts and 
circumstances” type of inquiry.  But we recommend attaching conditions before the group can 
avail itself of that option.   
Most importantly, the Final Rule should condition eligibility for facts & circumstances 
determinations on the organization’s waiver of § 6103 confidentiality in the audit processes and 
outcomes.15  Complex examinations of political activity simply cannot succeed in secrecy.  As 
recent experience suggests, public confidence in IRS evaluation of political activity is crucial 
both to the success of the Exempt Organizations unit and the Service overall.  Voters are rightly 
concerned about the possibility of subjectivity creeping into complex balancing tests.  Disclosure 
of all audit materials (except perhaps those related to confidential donor information, trade 
secrets, or the like), IRS deliberations, and final outcomes would greatly alleviate these fears.  
Further, in the past many organizations under investigation have opportunistically relied on 
confidentiality to claim selective prosecution, undermining meaningful enforcement efforts.   
 It might be argued that a test based primarily on expenditures unfairly favors groups that 
can rely on volunteer efforts, but we think  excluding volunteer time can be justified based on 
congressional intent and good policy.  For one, as we have argued, the central problem 
confronting the c(4) regime is that groups are using the c(4) form to evade the disclosure 
provisions in § 527(j) and FECA.  Those provisions relate only to the disclosure of contributions 
and expenditures of cash or property.  Congress chose not to require disclosures of campaign-
                                                 
15 In our view such a requirement would not contravene § 6103.  Since the organization under examination is not 
compelled to waive, and since (given the availability of §527) there is no dollar impact of refusing the facts & 
circumstances review, we think it is at least a reasonable interpretation of § 6103 to hold that disclosure in such 
circumstances is not “making known in any manner whatever…return information.”  I.R.C. § 6103(b)(8); cf. Donald 
Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION 
L.J. 427, 441-42 (2011)  (arguing that voluntary disclosure by taxpayer in exchange for additional benefits from 
government does not violate §6103). 
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related volunteer time, and it would be at best odd for an anti-abuse regime to require more 
disclosure than the underlying law it is aimed at shoring up.   
 Furthermore, the line Congress drew was a sensible one.  Accounting for all volunteers 
would be cumbersome.  Volunteerism also tracks genuine intensity of human commitment far 
more closely than does money.  While expenditures also allow voters to signal the strength of 
their beliefs, the meaningfulness of that signal is clouded by the diminishing marginal utility of 
money.  A one-million dollar expenditure by a multi-national corporation---representing an 
average cost of a few pennies for each of its shareholders---is not remotely comparable, in terms 
of genuine “utility” cost, to the same total expenditure by hundreds of middle-class families.  If 
disclosure is intended to accomplish anything, it is to allow the voting public to recognize when 
some interests are wielding money to acquire influence that far exceeds their relative welfare 
gains.   Moreover, volunteering is “republican”; it creates opportunities for real human 
interactions, conversations, and debate in a way that a one-directional bombardment of paid 
political advertising does not.  Finally, to the extent that subsidies are relevant, tax subsidies 
magnify the impact of money, but not of volunteers. 
 Having said that, when money is required to build and maintain volunteer networks, that 
money should be disclosed.  Donations of phone or e-mail lists should be valued at their real cost 
or the price they could command from for-profit ventures.  Although our focus here is not on § 
501(c)(3) organizations, the Treasury may also wish to consider whether, when such lists are 
donated by§ 501(c)(3) organizations or shared by them with non-charitable subsidiaries, they 
should be treated the same as contributions of cash by such firms.   
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We Agree With the Proposed Broad Definition of Electioneering 
Turning, then, to the question of which kinds of activities would count against any 
expenditure limit, we generally agree with the Proposed Rule’s broad approach, although we 
think it could be broader still.  Including “quasi-political” activity as campaign related is 
important if we seek a regulation that recognizes political realities.  Over and over again, the 
types of activities referenced by the Notice have been used by groups as integral parts of groups’ 
strategies to influence elections, while at the same time, arguing the activity is not political.  In 
fact, social welfare organizations rarely engage in these activities in a nonpartisan manner.  If the 
social welfare organization was engage in a substantial amount of nonpartisan activities listed in 
the regulation, the organization would organize as a § 501(c)(3) organization and receive the 
more favorable tax treatment.   The Notice tackles the problem of quasi-political activity by 
recognizing political realty and classifying this activity as campaign related political activity. 
For example, social welfare groups have held political events designed to motivate 
“base” supporters, and invited political candidates to rallies and claimed that activities were 
social welfare educational activities.16  Groups have also engaged in get-out-the-vote activities 
designed to defeat a particular candidate, and distributed literature on behalf of a candidate while 
claiming the activity was not political.17  These quasi-campaign related activities are very 
difficult to police and are often political activities masquerading as social welfare or educational 
activities.  The bright-line test in the proposed regulations makes clear that these quasi-campaign 
activities are treated as campaign related for the purposes of determining whether an 
organization’s primary purpose is social welfare. 
                                                 
16 E.g., Joe Hallett, It’ll Be a Long Campaign for Ohio’s Fact-Checkers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 9, 2013. 
17 Nicholas Confessore & Michael Luo, Groups Targeted by I.R.S. Tested Rules on Politics, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 
2013, at A1 (Tetumpka Tea Party get-out-the-vote drive designed to defeat President Obama, and Ohio Liberty 
Coalition claimed the distribution of door hangers for Romney was not political). 
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Because social welfare organizations may engage in some level of candidate-related 
political activity , it is less troublesome that some of the advocacy may be advocacy that would 
traditionally not be considered intervention in a political campaign.  These activities are simply 
part of the allowed activities of social welfare organizations that are not part of the 
organization’s primary purpose.  Since a social welfare organization is still allowed to engage in 
some of this activity, the fact that this activity is not considered intervention in a political 
campaign in the § 501(c)(3) context is not problematic.  In passing § 501(c)(4) Congress used the 
term “exclusively” in the statute.  The current regulations expand on that term, so a definition of 
candidate- related political activity that is restrictive is still consistent with congressional intent.  
In fact, even this definition is broader than the statutory language because it still allows some 
amount of activities that are not social welfare activities.  To the extent organizations want to 
engage in significant non-partisan activities that are classified as candidate-related activities 
under the proposed regulations, the organizations can conduct such activities through a 
connected § 501(c)(3) or § 527 organization. 
On this basis, we agree with the Notice’s bright-line definition of candidate-related 
political activity, and would additionally urge the Treasury to treat most communications 
directed to the general public, and which mention the name of a candidate for office, as 
electioneering, regardless of when in an election cycle the communication occurs.  Our 
experience is that all or nearly all such communications are in fact motivated by electoral 
politics.  As most organizations know, mass-market advertising is an exceptionally inefficient 
way to convey lobbying information, because only a fraction of the “eyeballs” that advertisers 
must pay to reach are those who are known to be sympathetic to the lobbying endeavor.   In 
contrast, electioneering communications outside the window close to an election can still work to 
15 
 
“frame” and “define” candidates for voters before they begin to pay close attention to the race, 
and are especially cost-effective given that political ad rates are much cheaper outside the 60-day 
window.  We acknowledge that such a rule would risk sweeping in some small fraction of 
lobbying speech, but the downsides of that outcome are small.  We emphasize again that there 
would be few meaningful consequences for organizations if their communications are treated as 
candidate-related; those expenditures would simply have to be made out of a related firm or 
segregated fund subject to § 527 disclosure rules.  However, to the extent that effective lobbying 
may sometimes require that activists be able to connect legislative outcomes with named 
individuals, and the IRS deems separate filing for such communications to be unduly 
burdensome, the Final Rule could permit a narrow exception for communications outside the 
near-election window that mention a candidate’s name only in connection with a specific vote on 
a specific piece of legislation.   
 
An Anti-Abuse Rule to Prevent Cash Cycling Is Necessary and the Service’s 
Approach is Sensible 
The bright-line rule that the entire contribution will be considered campaign related 
unless the recipient certifies that it spends no money on campaign related activity is very strict, 
but it has the significant benefit of seriously limiting major abuse.  A social welfare organization 
that legitimately wants to contribute to another social welfare organization that engaged in some 
campaign related activity could still make the donation.  The only consequence under the 
proposed regulation is that the spending will not count as social welfare spending in determining 
an organization’s primary purpose. 
16 
 
Eligibility for Exemption Under § 527 
 If the meaning of “primarily” in § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) is interpreted as we propose, and 
no corresponding changes are made to the regulations under § 527, certain organizations may 
arguably be ineligible for exemption under any provision of the Code.  Section 527(e)(1) limits 
the scope of 527 exemption to an “organization … organized and operated primarily for the 
purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both, for an 
exempt function.’’  Some lobbying organizations may engage in such “substantial” 
electioneering that they are ineligible under § 501(c)(4), but not so much that electioneering is 
their “primary” activity.  Depending on how §527(e)(1) is read, these groups might fail to qualify 
under either standard. 
 It is highly improbable that Congress could have intended such a result.  In effect, groups 
that devote either most or only a small fraction of their resources to electioneering would be 
exempt, but not those that allocate an intermediate amount.  Further, as we have suggested, 
Congress’ central goal in the 2000 amendments to § 527 was to allow for greater public scrutiny 
of groups engaged in partisan politics.  There is no reason Congress would have wanted to 
exclude from the §527 regulatory regime organizations that make “substantial” electioneering 
expenditures.  Instead, Congress could plausibly have included the “primarily” language to 
exclude for-profit businesses from obtaining tax exemption. 
 It might be argued that this gap is a reason to reject our reading of  the term “exclusively” 
in § 501(c)(4), but we think instead that the gap can easily be eliminated by interpreting § 527 to 
permit eligibility for groups with only “substantial” amounts of electioneering.  For example, the 
Service could rule that exempt activities under another provision of section 501 would also be 
exempt under § 527.  That is, § 501 exempt activities would not count in the “denominator” 
when assessing the share of the organization’s efforts devoted to “exempt function” activity 
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under § 527.  In this way, groups that lobby in pursuit of the common good, as permitted under § 
501(c)(4), but that engage in too much electioneering to be eligible under that section would still 
qualify under § 527.   
 The IRS can further mitigate any administrative burdens of the § 527 regime by 
permitting joint recognition of organizations as exempt under both § 501(c)(4) and § 527.  For 
example, the Service could provide that an otherwise-qualifying § 501(c)(4) organization can 
retain that status so long as any disqualifying candidate-related expenditures are incurred through 
a segregated fund, and contributions to and expenditures by the fund comply with § 527.  That is, 
the organization would not need to separately incorporate an affiliated firm, and could comply 
with both § 501(c)(4) and § 527 simply through accounting fully and publicly for the source of 
candidate-related expenditures.   
In addition, the IRS should clarify, through regulation, that the provisions in §527 apply 
to all organizations that have as their primary purpose influencing elections.  The statute is 
written in a way that makes § 527 status mandatory for all entities that are primarily engaged in 
influencing elections.18  If §527 treatment is mandatory, then an organization could not escape § 
527’s disclosure provisions merely by claiming, for example, to be a taxable organization. 
The Final Rule Should Also Cover Other Tax-Exempt Organizations 
The Notice invites comment regarding whether the Final Rule should apply to other tax-
exempt organizations.  The history in this area is very clear.  If the final regulations do not apply 
similar requirements to all 501(c) organizations other than charities, organizations will simply 
reorganize under another provision of the Code.  Organizations are already using § 501(c)(6) 
                                                 
18 See Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1282 (S.D. Ala. 2001); Nat’l 
Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1308 n.7 (S.D. Ala. 2002); Rev. Rul. 2003-
49 Answer 20 (indicating that an organization is subject to § 527 if it meets the definition of political organization in 
§ 527(e)). 
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business leagues and § 501(c)(19) veterans organizations as a means of engaging in campaign 
related activity, and § 501(c) contains numerous opportunities for organizations that could be 
used as an end run around these regulations.  Allowing any of these avenues to remain open 
would frustrate Congress’s disclosure goals. 
We think that the absence of language specifically limiting political activity in many of 
these sections is not an obstacle to applying the Final Rule to them.  As courts and the Treasury 
have recognized, §§ 501(c)(5), (6), and (7) impliedly limit the activities of eligible organizations 
to those implicitly contemplated by the statute.19  Further, §527(f) applies a surtax on 
electioneering expenditures to all 501(c) organizations, suggesting that Congress contemplated 
that the §527 regime would work together with all of the provisions of § 501(c).  At a minimum, 
then, we believe it would not be unreasonable for Treasury to interpret §527(j) also to extend to 
c(5), (6), and (7), as we have argued it does for §501(c)(4). 
Extending the Final Rule to § 501(c)(3) Organizations Presents Special 
Considerations  
While we recognize that § 501(c)(3) presents special considerations we have not closely 
considered here, we believe that extending the reach of the Final Rule to § 501(c)(3) has some 
distinctive advantages.  For one, the public, government, and practitioners would all be better 
served if political activity rules moved towards simplification rather than proliferation.  For 
another, the lesson of history again is that leaving one organizational form outside the disclosure 
regime will only shift campaign spending towards those firms.  The Final Rule should not 
generate new incentives to use c(3) organizations for electioneering purposes.  
Admittedly, however, both the Proposed Rule and our comments here presume that the 
definition of campaign activity can be broadened because the organizational consequences of 
                                                 
19 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969); Aprill, 10 Election L.J. at 381-82. 
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excessive electioneering are minor.  That presumption may not hold for charitable organizations, 
which under current law are putatively forbidden from engaging in any campaign activities.  And 
the loss of eligibility for deductible contributions (along with any affiliated state tax advantages) 
would be a major blow to many firms. 
Accordingly, we believe that further study and public comment are necessary before 
extending the definitions proposed in the Notice to § 501(c)(3) organizations.          
Treasury Should Consider Issuing Complementary Rules that Would Also 
Apply to Some For-Profit Firms  
Organizations have consistently sought organizational forms that allow them to engage in 
anonymous campaign advocacy.  Clarification of the rules surrounding tax-exempt organizations 
and campaign advocacy may encourage organizations to seek out alternative entity 
classifications as a means of avoiding restrictions created by the new regulations.  Absent further 
clarification of the tax treatment of taxable entities involved in campaigns, there is significant 
risk that organizations will forgo tax-exempt status and instead organize as taxable organizations.  
At the moment, it is not clear what the tax ramifications would be to a taxable organization 
involved in campaign advocacy.  Without further clarification by the IRS, taxable organizations 
may be the next vehicle of choice to avoid campaign finance disclosure, and may once again 
embroil the IRS in unnecessary political decisions.20   
Although any taxable campaign organization would be subject to tax, the amount of 
taxable income for an organization might be small.  Section 162(e) prohibits an organization 
from deducting political expenditures as an ordinary and necessary business expense, so 
presumably a taxable organization would have some tax liability if its primary purpose was 
                                                 
20 It is outside the scope of this article to discuss all the difficult questions raised by the use of taxable entities for 
political campaign advocacy.  For a more thorough discussion of this issue pre-Citizens United see Donald Tobin, 
Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, Are They the Next “Loophole”?, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41 (2007).   
Post-Citizens United, taxable corporations are an even more attractive vehicle for campaign advocacy. 
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campaign related because it could not deduct campaign related expenditures.  However, if the 
organization had little to no income, there would be nothing to tax.  Thus, if contributions to the 
taxable organization were not considered income, then there would be very little tax 
consequences to using a taxable form as a campaign vehicle. 
The IRS rulings in this area are very old, and are ambiguous regarding whether 
contributions to a taxable campaign organization would be income.  The IRS should clarify that 
contributions to taxable organizations for campaign advocacy are income to the corporation and 
subject to tax.  Alternatively, the IRS should conclude that contributions are gifts and thus 
subject to gift tax.  It should also clarify that taxable entities cannot circumvent this treatment by 
claiming that payments to the taxable entity are contributions to capital. 
In addition, the IRS should clarify, through regulation, that the provisions in §527 apply 
to all organizations that have as their primary purpose influencing elections.  The statute is 
written in a way that makes §527 status mandatory for all entities that are primarily engaged in 
influencing elections.  If §527 treatment is mandatory, then an organization could not escape 
§527’s disclosure provisions merely by claiming to be a taxable organization. 
The IRS Should Get Serious on Enforcement and Reporting  
Another omission in the Proposed Rule is that the regulations do not do enough to 
address the enforcement issues that surfaced as part of the current crisis.  The Administration 
should set out clear and transparent guidance regarding when and how it will enforce the current 
rules governing tax-exempt organizations.  In the past it appears the IRS has failed to enforce 
these rules because it feared entering the political fray, and there have been almost no court cases 
involving the enforcement of political restrictions on tax-exempt organizations.  The regulations 
will have no effect if the IRS continues its practice of failing to enforce the requirements. 
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Regardless of whatever course the Final Rule follows, the IRS should ensure that 
government officials and the public can assess the true scope of political activities by nonprofit 
organizations.  Due to easily-remedied failures in updating its reporting methods, IRS electronic 
databases for fiscal years after 2008 fail to include a line item for political expenditures by § 
501(c)(4) organizations.  Even more critically, in our individualized examination of the tax 
returns of both § 501(c)(3) and§  501(c)(4) organizations, we see again and again that even those 
organizations reported publicly to have engaged in extensive lobbying and partisan activity 
declare little if any such activity on their tax returns.  In many cases it appears that organizations 
take the position that they do not need to report expenditures as lobbying or electioneering-
related to the extent that the activities in question could plausibly (or in some cases, in our view, 
implausibly) be defended as “educational.”   
Just as individual taxpayers must disclose uncertain legal positions, nonprofit 
organizations should be required to disclose the legal reasoning behind their reporting position.  
Given that the border between lobbying communications and those that merely “educate” the 
public is rarely self-evident, organizations should at a minimum be asked to disclose the total 
cost of all their public communications.   
 There Are No First Amendment Concerns With the Proposed Rule  
 Finally, we wish to respond to other commenters who have argued that IRS regulation of 
political activity infringes on their First Amendment rights.  As the Supreme Court has held, § 
501’s political limitations do not burden free speech, at least in the case in which organizations 
have alternative opportunities for exercising their political views.  Both the Proposed Rule and 
other suggestions here would leave groups free to engage in electioneering through an affiliated 
§ 527 organization. 
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 Citizens United and other recent decisions do not undermine that rule, and indeed 
arguably strengthen it.  It is true that the Citizens United Court held that the administrative 
difficulties of establishing a separate PAC could constitute a burden on the free speech rights of 
corporate shareholders.  We agree with Professors Aprill and Galston that the 501/527 regime is 
distinguishable.21  For example, once a group has already filed a Form 1023, and is regularly 
filing Form 990’s, the added burden of also filing a §527 notice is modest, especially if the IRS 
simply permits the group to conduct candidate-related activities through a segregated fund.   
 More importantly, the government can assert compelling interests in regulating nonprofit 
political activity that were not available to it in Citizens United.  First, as Citizens United 
recognizes, the government retains a compelling interest in revealing the sources of campaign 
spending.  We argued earlier that the Notice is essential to the proper functioning of both §527(j) 
and FECA’s disclosure regime more generally. 
 Next, the government has compelling interests in preserving the proper functioning of the 
non-profit sector its subsidies have helped to build and support.  As discussed above, separating 
electioneering from other social welfare activities helps to preserve public support for the non-
profit mission.  Political limits also ensure that the § 170 matching grant does not distort the 
political process.  While § 501(c)(4) organizations of course do not directly receive such 
subsidies, many c(4) organizations benefit from the resources, staff, and name recognition of an 
affiliated c(3).   
 Accordingly, we believe that the Constitution offers no reason for the Treasury to turn 
aside from policies that would best serve the non-profit sector and the nation as a whole.   
*** 
                                                 
21 Aprill, 10 Election L.J. at 398; Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and 
Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 867, 907-11 (2011). 
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We thank the Service for taking the time to review our comments.  We welcome additional 
follow-up questions at brian.galle@bc.edu or tobin.46@osu.edu 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ 
 
Brian Galle  
Associate Professor, Boston College Law School 
 
Donald Tobin 
John C. Elam/Vorys Sater Professor of Law, 
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. 
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February 24, 2014 
The Honorable John A. Koskinen 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-134417-13), Room 5205 
Internal Revenue Service 
1111 Constitution Avenue NW 
Washington, DC 20224 
Re: Comments on Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate- 
Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) 
 
Submitted By:  
 
Brian Galle, Associate Professor, Boston College Law School; and  
Donald Tobin, John C. Elam/Vorys Sater Professor of Law, Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law. 
 
Dear Commissioner Koskinen: 
 
We respectfully submit these comments in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (the 
“Notice”) issued by the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS” or “Service”) and the Treasury 
Department on November 29, 2013. : 
Executive Summary 
The Notice is  a good first step.  It creates bright-line standards that are easy to apply and 
that will eliminate much of the gray area regarding permissible political activity.  Clearer lines 
will reduce the discretion on the part of the IRS.  By decreasing the IRS’s discretion, the 
regulation will reduce the opportunity for the IRS to be used as a political tool in an 
Administration’s tool box. 
However, the Notice does not go far enough.  Congress has established a regulatory 
regime that has as its central purpose the disclosure of any significant campaign contributions by 
individuals or firms.  In recent years many organizations have exploited the confidentiality rules 
of § 501(c)(4) to evade that regime, to the detriment not only of U.S. political discourse but also 
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the non-profit sector.  The Final Rule should ensure that groups with significant partisan political 
activity cannot obtain exemption under § 501(c)(4), or indeed under any parallel provision of § 
501.     
We believe, however, that groups carrying out “substantial” electioneering activities 
should generally be eligible for exemption under § 527, and that the IRS should make that clear 
in the Final Rule.  The main consequence of any ruling denying § 501(c)(4) status based on the 
political activity of the organization, therefore, would simply be to require the disclosure of an 
organization’s donors, and to ensure that the organization’s political expenditures are disclosed 
contemporaneously with the election they seek to influence.   
Accordingly, the Final Rule should be designed in a way that channels organizations with 
any substantial amount of undisclosed electioneering activity into § 527.  For example, we 
propose a strong presumption that any group with candidate-related political activityof more than 
10% of its budget, or of more than an overall cap of some amount, such as $1 million, whichever 
is lesser, should be recognized as a § 527 political organization and not as a § 501c(4) social 
welfare organization.  The final rule should interpret “electioneering” broadly to include facially 
non-partisan activities that can be used to partisan advantage, including candidate-related 
advertising that falls outside the window immediately surrounding an election.  Groups that 
voluntarily disclose their donors could retain c(4) status.   
 Additionally, we suggest that the IRS seriously consider developing rules to limit the use 
of for-profit entities to evade § 527.  We urge the IRS to take a clearer stand on its enforcement 
plans and legally dubious Forms 990.  And we argue that nothing in the Notice, or in what we 
additionally suggest here, would raise serious First Amendment concerns.  
